from the Answers site, forming a database of more than 40,000 questions and answers.
With only a few exceptions, 1 I observe all Google Answers questions and answers posted through November 2003.
For each question asked, I observe the question itself (text, title, substantive categorization within Google Answers' taxonomy), the time at which it was asked, the payment amount offered by asker to answerer, and the asker's username. For answered questions, I observe the time at which the question was answered, the answer itself (including le ngth in characters, and number of included URLs), and the answerer's username. When the asker rated the answer, I observe the rating; when the asker offered a gratuity to the answerer, I observe the amount of the gratuity. I also observe occasional addit ional discussion of the question and/or answer by actual or would-be answerers, asker, and other visitors to Google Answers; however, I have not used these discussions in my analysis to date.
Google Answers allows an answerer to "lock" a question -obtaining the temporary exclusive right to answer it for the following four to eight hours (depending on question price). However, I do not observe the time when an answerer "locked" a question.
2
Occasionally an asker is sufficiently dissatisfied with a question that the asker requests a refund from Google. If Google staff deem an answer unacceptably poor under Google Answers rules, the payment to answerer may be reversed. I do not observe the 1 Exceptions include questions for some reason removed by Google (e.g. for profanity or other prohibited content). 2 Google Answers lock terms have changed somewhat over time. I lack information about the precise form of rules previously in effect and about the dates of transition between rules. However, my sense is that the changes are small and are second-order to the other effects discussed.
disposition of refunded questions, but I do observe the total number of refunded answers submitted by each answerer.
Google Answers receives two kinds of payments for its efforts in facilitating matches between askers and answerers. First, Google Answers receives a $0.50 listing fee for each question, whether answered or not. Second, Google Answers receives a 25% commission of answer prices for answered questions. However, Google Answers takes no commission on gratuities.
Google Answers questions may range in price from $2 to $200.
Summary Statistics
To the best of my knowledge, there have been no prior economic analyses of Google Answers. 3 In Table 1 , I offer selected summary statistics to give a general sense of this unstudied market. earnings include a few extreme outliers, including one answerer who has netted some $17,000 from Google Answers for providing more than 900 answers. Answers tend to be provided quickly, with half of answered questions answered within three hours. Ratings are clustered at high values, with ratings below 4 assigned to less than 3% of rated answers.
What Do Askers Value?
Available data offer two distinct measurements of answer quality as perceived by askers. First, some askers chose to rate the answers they receive, providing numeric assessments of subjective ans wer quality (values of 1 to 5, with half-points permitted).
Second, some askers offer gratuities to their answerers -pure gifts in no way required by Google Answers rules, for which askers receive no direct benefit.
4
In modeling what characteristics askers value in answers, there are three clear objective measures of answer characteristics likely of interest: answer length in characters, number of URL references in answer, and time in minutes between asking a question and receiving an answer.
5
Straightforward regressions of rating and of tip on length and/or URL count yield insight as to askers' preferences. In multiple regression specifications, 6 answer length has statistically significant positive coefficients when predicting rating. This findings suggests that whatever weight askers might place on conciseness, conciseness is not sufficient to overwhelm the risk of incomplete answers. Longer answers also yield both more frequent and larger gratuities.
The effect of URL references is somewhat more amb iguous, though ultimately still positive. In regressions of answer rating, number of URL references takes an 4 The reason why askers provide such gratuities is itself something of a puzzle. Gratuities might have reputational benefits to askers, e.g. increasing the expected total revenue to answers who answer the asker's future questions. But Google Answers' search function does not facilitate searching by asker, i.e. to determine whether a given answer is one who has tipped in the past and might therefore be thought likely to tip in the future. Nonetheless, gratuities aren't mere follies of novice askers; tip amount is positively associated with asker experience (P<0.001). Agency problems might explain gratuities (e.g. askers are spending others' money), but gratuities are only weakly positively associated with submitting a question during the business day, one possible method of distinguishing business askers from personal askers. 5 However, it is not obvious from first principles that length and URLs are always positively associated with answer quality: A more concise answer might be preferable to a long answer. 6 The result holds in the following model specifications: OLS regressions in which rating takes an ordinal value (1 to 5). OLS regressions for which ordinal rating is transformed via the inverse logit function. Logit regressions for which rating is expressed as a Boolean value of 5 versus not-5. Logit regressions for which rating is a Boolean of at-least-4 versus lower.
insignificantly negative coefficient when answer length is also included as a regressor.
But this result seems to reflect the high correlation between answer length and URL references -not surprising since many long answers earn their length via extended quotes from referenced URLs. When answer length is excluded from a regression predicting ratings, URL reference count takes a weakly significant positive coefficient (P=0.055).
When predicting gratuities, URL references have greater power, taking on significantly positive coefficients -suggesting more URLs may not be needed for a good answer (even one worth of a "5" rating) but that more are needed for a "great" answer (one receiving a gratuity, especially a large gratuity).
The effect of time in minutes between asking a question and receiving an answer takes varied coefficients, ranging from significantly negative to insignificantly positive, depending on the specification of the model. This suggests that whatever weight answerers place on a timely answer is confounded by covariates, e.g. that a faster answer might tend to be of lower quality ("rushed" rather than "thorough"). See also discussion in Section 5, relating answerer earnings to effort in minutes. Table s 2 and 3 give the results of the regressions described in this section.
Experience and Learning on the Job
Traditional labor market literature suggests that on-the-job learning plays a significant role in developing worker skills and in facilitating worker productivity.
Jovanovic 1996. Analysis of Google Answers confirms the existence of significant onthe-job learning in this market. See results in Table 4 . These results provide prima facie evidence of learning on the job.
While answerer experience contributes in part to the higher ratings of more experienced answers, their higher ratings also reflect a selection effect. Not all answerers remain in Google Answers for the extended period necessary to obtain high experience; many answerers drop out. The "high type" answerers who stay are predictably different from those who leave: Even at the time of their initial answers, high type answers already were earning higher ratings. To isolate this effect, I regress answer rating on contemporary answerer experience as well as an indicator reporting whether answerer experience ultimately exceeded ten (an indicator for high type answerers), and I limit the analysis to each answerer's first ten answers (or fewer, for answerers who dropped out before answering ten questions). 7 I find a statistically significantly positive coefficient on the indicator variable for ultimately answering more than ten questions -meaning that the high type answerers already receive higher ratings in their initial answers. See results in Table 5 .
Although selection effects explain a portion of the positive association between experience and ratings, selection effects do not fully negate the hypothesis of learning on the job. For one, note the positive coefficients on contemporary experience in Table 5 .
In addition, the positive association between experience and ratings holds even among answerers' initial answers, before selection effects can fully take hold. See the positive coefficients on experience when predicting ratings in restricted samples of answers, as shown in the first three columns of Table 6 .
Answerers adjust their behavior ("learn") to suit asker preferences for length and URL count. More experienced users tend to submit answers that users view more favorably -a positive coefficient on experience when predicting answer length and when predicting URL count. This result holds across all answerers as well as among new answerers (e.g. regressions restricted to each answerer's first ten answers) and among drop-out answerers (who ultimately answer ten or fewer questions). See results in Table 7 . However, as in Table 5 , answerer ultimate experience also takes a positive coefficient -suggesting that selection effects also play a role in answerers' evolving answer characteristics.
Hourly Pay as a Function of Experience
In general it is difficult to measure the amount of time an answerer invests in answering a question. Answerer work time is unobserved even to Google and to the 7 Throughout, regressions were run with other thresholds, yielding comparable results.
asker -for the answerer merely posts an answer into the Google Answers system, thereby completing his responsibilities as an answerer, without explicitly reporting time expended on the task. However, answerer effort can be inferred from elapsed time between when a question is asked and when it is answered. This is so because answerers compete with each other, racing to lock a question (to obtain the exclusive right to answer it) and then promptly preparing answers (typically submitting answers well before the time-limited "lock" expires). The Google Answers "lock" rules encourage these answerer races:
Google Answers rules limit an answerer to holding two questions locked at any instant (and social norms and Google guidelines further limit an answerer to a single lock except under special circumstances, e.g. when seeking clarification from an asker 8 ). Under these circumstances, the delay in minutes between when a question was asked and when it was answered provides a good measure of answerer effort expended in answering a given question.
Of course, even the most self-interested answerer does not merely minimize effort expend iture (e.g. minutes per question); a more sensible objective would be to maximize pay per minute. I therefore form a variable that gives the quotient of answer price (in dollars) divided by minutes of work (formed as described above). I restrict analysis in this section to questions for which an answer was posted within the maximum lock period plus 60 minutes -intended to capture only those questions for which the race condition (described above) was binding and for which the delay between asking and answering a question gives a good measure of answerer effort.
Even with the restriction to quickly-answered questions, this measure likely overstates answerer effort: If a question is answered (for example) 75 minutes after it was asked, answerer effort must be less than 75 minutes. After all, the answerer is unlikely to have noticed the new question mere seconds after its submission, and the answerer could have stopped to take a phone call or read email midway through his supposed answer
effort Answer length and URL count are also found to be positively associated with pay per minute, all significantly. This suggests that the answerers who provide longer answers earn higher pay per minute even after controlling for experience. If longer answers are presumed to require more minutes of effort, 10 then the positive association between high pay per minute and long answer length means that some answers are exogenously so much more productive that they can both provide higher quality answers and simultaneously nonetheless earn higher pay per minute. Alternatively, following the suggestion above that longer answers could be less valuable to askers (who might value brevity), the higher pay per minute of long answers might be taken to reflect answerer rushing (e.g. lack of editing that causes longer answers, faster answers, and higher answerer pay per minute).
See results in Table 8 .
Specialization
As answerers become more experienced, they come to specialize in answering particular kinds of questions. To measure specialization, I form variables that report the number of distinct question categories to which an answer has recently provided answers.
I group categories into "one digit codes" ("Arts and Entertainment," "Business,"
"Computers" and so forth) and "two digit codes" (e.g. within Business: "Advertising,"
"Accounting," "Consulting," and so forth). In particular, I measure the number of distinct one and two-digit codes represented among an answerer's most recent ten answers, reckoned as of the time of each answer submitted.
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The number of distinct question categories in which an answerer has participated is decreasing in the answerer's specialization, as the term is usually used, because a more specialized answerer has participated in fewer categories. To give my specialization variables the intuitive interpretation, such that a larger value reflects greater specialization, I transform the specialization variables by subtracting them from their maximum (ten, since analysis considers each answerer's most recent ten answers). I refer to the resulting variable as a specialization index, using the one-digit specialization measure except where otherwise indicated.
I find a statistically significant positive coefficient on the specialization index when predicting experience, implying that on the whole, more experienced answerers are more specialized. 12 See results in Table 9 .
I find statistically significant positive coefficients on the specialization index when predicting ratings and when predicting gratuities. These results indicate that more specialized answerers earn higher ratings and greater gratuities, even when controlling for answerer experience. However, in some specifications, the coefficient on experience ceases to be significant, suggesting that experience may primarily affect ratings through its effect on specialization. See results in Table 10 .
I find statistically significant negative coefficients on specialization when predicting pay per hour, implying that more specialized answerers earn less per hour. See the first column of Table 11 . This result initially seems counterintuitive, particularly given the finding (above) that more experienced answerers tend to be more specialized.
But this finding makes sense due to the relative abundance of answerers relative to questions seeking answers: When an answerer insists on staying within a particular substantive field, the answerer foregoes opportunities in other fields, however lucrative those opportunities might be. This theory is confirmed by the third column of Table 11, 12 Analysis is limited to each answerer's first 100 answers. Those few answerers who have answered more than 100 questions defy the relationship described here. For them, the limited pool of questions available likely requires that they answer a broader swath of questions, from a more varied set of categories, in order to have answered so many questions. finding a negative relationship between specialization and average price of answered questions.
This analysis suggests that answerer "specialization" may not be an unambiguously positive characteristic. For question askers, specialization is associated with favorable ratings, per above, making specialization a positive attribute (intuitively:
"my question was answered by an expert in this field"). But from answerers' perspective, "specialization" could be recast as "lack of versatility" -an inability or disinclination to answer whatever questions arise, and therefore a negative characteristic when predicting earnings.
With this understanding of answer quality vis-à-vis answerer specialization, Google could improve answer quality by requiring answerers to stay within their onedigit or two-digit category or categories of expertise. Such a rule would prohibit answerers from straying to give answers that may be profitable to answerers, but that on average are less well-received. These results indicate that answerers receive a compensating differential -higher pay per minute -in exchange for answering questions during the business day. Such compensation makes sense in equilibrium because answerers have more favorable outside employment options during the business day. The net effect is likely larger than Table 14 indicates because business day answers are also more than twice as likely to receive a gratuity (15% rather than 7%) and therefore receive larger tips in expectation ($1.34 in expectation, versus $0.61); experienced answerers are likely to know of the interaction between business day answers and gratuities, since gratuities are publicly posted.
The correct interpretation of these differential values of answerer pay per minute seems to be as compensating differentials rather than as arbitrage opportunities. To obtain the higher pay per minute, answerers must modify their behavior by answering questions during the business day, likely a costly change for many answerers (e.g. those with other business day obligations). Indeed, more experienced answerers do not tend to take advantage of the compensating differentials. Table 15 indicates that more experienced answerers are significantly less likely to answer questions during the business day, while more experienced answers are no t significantly more likely than other answerers to answer questions on Monday and are no t significantly less likely to answer on Sundays. These findings are consistent intuition that the "graveyard shift" is undesirable in traditional industries -even with whatever additional pay it may offer.
Extensions and Future Work
I like the prospect of studying purely electronic labor markets -wherein the entire employment relationship takes place online. Google Answers provides one obvious such example, but my further work here would be much aided by even fuller data. For example, it would be helpful to know answerers' education and geographic location, both of which would begin to speak to outside employment options. I believe Google received this data from answerer membership applications (which include resumes and other personal information), but the data may not be in organized, machine-readable form. In any event, I have so far been fruitless in my inquiries to contacts at Google.
I know I will need more focus to make for a compelling journal article ; as it stands, my draft offers a laundry list of questions the existing data can answer, but I so far lack any single question or unifying theme. I could readily make my analysis These histograms plot the time in minutes between question submission and answer, for questions that are answered. The first histogram gives a full plot of the entire distribution, while the second and third reduce the X axis range to focus on questions answered quickly. The x axis is measured in minutes; 1440 minutes equals one day. Columns (1), (2), and (3) are restricted to each answerer's first 10 answers, no matter how many answers that answerer ultimately answered. Columns (4), (5), and (6) consider all questions answered by answerers who retained experience =10 throughout the data. Columns (7), (8), and (9) consider all questions answered by answerers who reached experience >10 sometime during the data. Columns (1) and (4) consider all answered questions. Columns (2) and (5) consider all answered questions for which contemporary answerer experience was =10. Columns (3) and (6) consider all answered questions for which ultimate answerer experience remained =10. Columns (1) through (3) consider all answered questions, while (4) through (6) consider only those answered questions for which the answerer, at the time of answering the question, had experience =100. Results consider only those answered questions for which the answerer, at the time of answering the question, had experience =100. Results consider only those answered questions for which the answerer, at the time of answering the question, had experience =100. 
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